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Introduction: 
 
 
By – David Vine  
Advisor – David Larcker 
Wharton Undergraduate Research Scholars 
WH-299-301 
April 2004 
 Research studies have long focused on the complexities of business valuation for a 
typical corporation, but very few have considered the mystery that looms over the sports 
franchise as an entity.  Over the last few years, the newspapers have been filled from 
cover to cover with stories of team bankruptcies, payroll shortfalls, and city relocations.  
Furthermore, almost every major sport in the last decade has experienced a work 
stoppage, usually a result of the huge operating losses allegedly experienced by the 
owners.  Nevertheless, with inflation remaining steady over the last few years, and the 
stock market in one of its worst funks in history, the market price for organizations has 
still managed to soar.  This is exemplified by Sections A-D of the appendices, which 
shows the upward trend in Forbes’ valuations from 1998-2003 across all four major 
sports. 
 
What then, one may ask, can explain the outrageous prices that individuals have been 
willing to pay to acquire a franchise of their own?  Clearly, this phenomenon doesn’t 
seem tied to any wealth effect.  In this paper, I will attempt to explain the drivers behind 
the value of sports franchises.  I will pay attention to all four major sports, both in 
isolation and as a large common group.  First, I will take a look at the analytical papers 
and existing research that have already been published. Then, I will examine in depth the 
data gathered by Forbes Magazine on an annual basis and compare these appraised values 
to the transactions that have actually transpired in the industry since 1999.   
 
As the following discussion will show, most existing theory and my own empirical 
analysis of Forbes’ data supports the notion that revenue is a key driver behind the 
valuation of sports franchises.  However, my examination will also show that there is 
more to the story than just revenues, and that Forbes fails to accurately account for all of 
a team’s worth.  Specifically, my transaction analysis shows that franchises typically 
demand a 27% premium to the figures devised by Forbes.   
 
It should be noted that although the conclusions I have reached in this project are well 
justified, they are far from fully exhaustive.  Nevertheless, they should still serve as a 
sufficient fundamental basis for future inquiries into the nature of the industry.   If owners 
can be provided with a solid blueprint as to how they should run an organization 
profitably, perhaps many of the economic problems that hinder the prosperity of the 
sports world today can be eliminated.  The realization of a more efficient market will not 
only serve to increase the loyalty of fans, but also should provide a huge stimulus to the 
domestic economy. 
 
Existing Literature: 
 
Value As A Sum Of The Parts: 
 
One of the most distinguishing features of a sports franchise is the supreme importance of 
intangible assets.   For the standard corporation, tangible assets such as machinery, 
property, and equipment are primary drivers in the valuation of a company.  However, 
these are not of preeminent relevance in considering the value of a sports entity.  Rather, 
it is the intangible assets, things such as player contracts, televisions rights, stadium 
leases, adverting agreements, concession agreements, luxury suite agreements, season 
ticket-holder relationships, coach and management employment contracts, draft rights, 
and goodwill that affect the market price.1  
 
Many standard procedures such as cost, sales comparisons, and income valuation 
approaches (discount cash flow analysis) are available to evaluate the aforementioned 
components, as with any other corporation, depending upon the particular situation at 
hand.  However, the choice of approach is very important, as it is imperative for franchise 
owners to provide a fair market assessment of their intangible assets in order to receive 
certain tax benefits from the Internal Revenue Service.  “Section 197” delineates the rigid 
rules governing the permissible amortization of acquired intangible assets for income tax 
planning.2   
 
Understanding and knowing the tax code can help potential franchise acquirers maximize 
their return on investment.  Typically, the exchange of a sports franchise is treated as an 
asset transaction, which provides flexibility to purchasers who want to realize certain tax 
write-offs.  This is likely an extremely important consideration for large corporate firms 
that engage in ownership such as Disney and Time Warner. Specifically, in any such 
deal, the intangible assets must be re-appraised at the time of sale and stepped up to their 
fair market value on the purchaser’s balance sheet.  As each of these items is taxed 
differently and only a few are amortizable for federal income tax purposes, certain 
incentives are imposed on new owners to allocate the purchase price to the assets that 
will receive the most favorable tax treatment.   However, although there certainly is 
wiggle room, firms may be called upon to justify the way that they distributed the 
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purchase price.  Accordingly, it is often wise for them to follow the industry standards 
that have been established.  The following chart indicates the common methodologies 
used in most transactions:3 
 
TABLE A 
Intangible Asset Valuation Methodology 
Player Contracts Cost Approach 
Franchise Agreements Income Approach 
Stadium Leases Marked Based Analysis / Income Approach 
Workforce Cost Approach 
Intellectual Property Typically encompassed in workforce 
Contracts Income Approach 
Season-Ticket Holder Subscriptions Income Approach 
Acquired Goodwill Residual Analysis of Price Allocations 
 
Case Analysis: Derived From Chistina Vogel’s Valuation of a Sports Franchise 
 
In situations such as this where there is not much data available and a standard has yet to 
be established by theorists, it is often useful to search out for precedents put forth by the 
judicial system.  In this particular field of study, there is one case that deals directly with 
the issues at hand in this project.  In Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, the court examined the 
value of the Chicago Bulls in an effort to resolve the amount of damages to be awarded to 
Illinois Basketball Inc., who claimed that their purchase of the franchise had been 
interfered with by Chicago Professional Sports Corporation. For the court, the resolution 
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of this conflict centered on two key issues: 1) should the court include intangible assets, 
such as the prestige of ownership, in the value of a sports franchise and 2) why buyers 
might be willing to pay a price that far exceeds that which traditional valuations metrics 
intimate is the market value.4  
 
In order to determine the proper damages that should have been awarded to Illinois 
Basketball, Inc., Christina Vogel, a professor at Wake Forest University, explains that the 
court found it necessary to determine the “lost appreciation value” of the Chicago Bulls.  
Inherent in this task was the need to produce an estimate of the present value of the 
franchise.  In order to do this, the court laid out many principles that they felt best 
highlighted the value that one could reasonably attribute to a sports franchise.  
Comparable transactions of other National Basketball Association (NBA) teams were the 
most central factor of the court’s consideration.  However, their examination was much 
more comprehensive, and included concentration on:  “(1) the trend in value of NBA 
clubs as shown by past sales; (2) profits and losses of NBA clubs, and the trend of profits 
and losses; (3) profits and losses of the Bulls, and the trend of profits and losses; (4) 
testimony of NBA owners and other experts; (5) changes in tax laws making ownership 
more or less desirable; (6) recent developments in pay TV; (7) changes in availability of 
arenas; and (8) changes in free agent rules.”5   
 
Despite the detailed effort of this independent review, the court ignored several factors 
that industry experts consider to be vital in making any predictions about the true worth 
of a franchise.  First and foremost, although the court acknowledged that player contracts 
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were indeed valuable assets, they did not believe they could be used to directly help in 
the appraisal of the team.  The court came to this rationale as a result of the distinctness 
of each player contract, which were all structured independently by the athletes.  As these 
could not be compared amongst themselves or to those in other team sales, there was no 
proper basis to guide a reasonable calculation of their importance. 6 
 
The court also ignored the “ego factor” in its assessment because it was deemed that a 
corporation could not realize this psychological prowess like an individual could.  The 
ego factor is a term that is often used to describe the pleasure that an owner derives from 
the prestige of sitting at the helm of a professional sports team’s enterprise.  Although it 
has always been difficult to prove the presence of this attribute through quantitative 
analysis, one need not look much further than the actions of George Steinbrenner of the 
New York Yankees or Mark Cuban of the Dallas Mavericks to see how much some 
people enjoy this limelight.  In fact, during the trial, various NBA owners were called in 
and provided sworn in testimony confirming that they viewed their position as status 
symbols that they relished.   William Putnam, then owner of the Atlanta Hawks, stated 
that the ego factor, not financial or tax considerations, was the premier consideration in 
valuing a sports franchise.  This statement provides some clarity to why owners would 
take over beleaguered teams that have failed miserably from an economic standpoint for 
years.  Consequently, the court’s decision here was certainly questionable, as at a 
minimum, IBI’s majority shareholders could have enjoyed some of this gratification. 7    
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Furthermore, the court did not glance at revenues, considered by many to be the best 
gauge of value, and rather, focused primarily on the numbers provided by the balance 
sheet.  This was a strange decision, as the balance sheet, which presents a snapshot of the 
assets, liabilities, and equity of a corporation, is for the most part comprised of data listed 
at historical cost.  The court attempted to extrapolate from these figures and derive the 
fair market value of the equity of the franchise, but any such extension is slightly 
arbitrary.  Further, this choice also forced the court to ignore the advantages provided by 
media distribution rights, which is also a leading source of franchise profitability.8  The 
extent of this oversight is substantiated by the huge appraisals given to teams like the 
New York Yankees, which employ their own cable network (YES Network), and the 
tremendous value of NFL franchises that result from the most lucrative television deals in 
professional sports.  
 
In analyzing the decision of the court, Vogel also provides insight into an “updated 
approach” for sports valuation.  She alludes to the extensive research compiled by 
Financial World Magazine, which ascertained that revenues, expenses, debt obligations, 
and venue rights were the most important determinants of value.  Forbes Magazine also 
came to the same realization, and accordingly, both apply a multiple to revenue based 
upon these others factors to arrive at a value of the entity on an annual basis.9 
 
Revenue is considered to be the most vital factor in valuation by both Financial World 
Magazine and Forbes because it is believed to be much more representative of long term 
values than operating income.  The reasoning behind this is that many things that affect 
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the franchise over the short term are included in operating expenses but obviously have 
no bearing on the future status of the organization.  For example, signing bonuses will 
significantly reduce operating income for any given year, but should not affect the overall 
profitability of the team moving forward.  It should also be noted that there are many 
different forms of revenue, such as franchise revenues resulting from suites, concession, 
parking and advertising, ticket revenue, venue naming rights, team merchandising and 
televisions fees.  These all are vital to the overall value of a franchise, and should be 
considered in any true examination of its fair market value.10 
 
The irrelevance of operating income as a tool for guiding value has been exemplified in 
the 2001 litigation between the National Football League and the Oakland Raiders.  In 
this trial, the NFL was forced to turn financial statements over to the court.  The 
treatment of some of the accounting figures in these documents should illustrate to the 
public why they should ignore profit or loss figures that are cried by owners.  For 
example, the Buffalo Bills showed $7.8 million in stadium expenses despite the fact that 
these are all assumed by Erie County.  Such a manipulation is only one of the many ploys 
owners use to lower their profitability to avoid taxes.  Accordingly, these numbers are 
subject to arbitrariness and often misrepresentative of a team’s well being.11 
 
Despite these attempts by Financial World Magazine and Forbes to provide accurate 
representations of the value of sports entities, transaction prices often far exceed that 
which is presented in their annual findings.  Is this solely a result of a prestige factor or is 
something else involved here as well?   For example, in 1998, the Dodgers sold for $311 
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million, almost $80 million more than Forbes’ estimated market value of $236 million. 
Many analysts believe that there are indeed other relevant factors that often escape 
Forbes’ analysis.  Specifically for the Dodgers, the owners also owned News Corp., the 
owners of Fox Networks, and thus the deal brought huge ratings to the company and in 
many ways complemented their niche products.12  The California Angels were similarly 
bought for the value that they could add to the extremely well marketed Disney image 
and broadcasting unit.   
 
Data Collection: 
 
The most complicated process of almost any empirical research study is data collection.  
This is the area where classroom work is distinguished from real world experience, as 
under a school’s umbrella, data is presented in its ideal form whereas in actuality things 
are messy and often imperfect.  This prophecy can certainly be extended as a 
characterization of my efforts to discover the mechanics of sports valuation.  It was much 
more difficult to gather information than I had expected, and in fact, I was even forced to 
revise my goals for the project. 
 
My initial proposal called for me to conduct a transaction analysis in hopes of 
determining the various factors that affect franchise value.  I planned on accomplishing 
this task through analyzing various changes in ownership that had taken place over the 
last several years and the range of issues that can drive a sport team’s cash flows.  After 
all, just like any other business, a sports franchise should technically be worth the present 
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value of its expected future cash flows.  Specifically, I hoped to conduct a multiple 
variable regression, using sales price as the dependent variable, and factors such as 
revenue, attendance, team performance, and debt/value ratios as the independent 
variables.   
 
However, as I proceeded with gathering the numbers, it became very apparent that it 
would be impossible to conduct such analysis of prior transactions.  Although purchase 
prices were readily available (the dependent variable), the figures corresponding to the 
independent variables such as revenues and debt/value ratios were not accessible moving 
backwards.  As most sports franchises are privately held, there is no obligation to report 
historical data, or really any present economic status as well. 
 
This highlights the most perplexing problem of any analysis of sports franchises.  In 
contrast to the typical firm that must meet SEC regulations and publish financial 
statements annually, sports franchises typically opt to be secretive about their profitability 
and sources of revenue.  Accordingly, they do not publish their internal records, which in 
turn makes it impossible to have a first hand account of their internal operations.  Only 
secondary sources can be accessed, which unavoidably, are subject to certain 
inaccuracies.   
 
That being said, the data provided by Forbes truly became the centerpiece of my efforts.  
One of the premier magazines, often commended for its thorough investigations and 
dedication to accurate journalism, Forbes clearly has the reputation to give credence to its 
findings.  Accordingly, I used their website to gain access to their archives and the 
information they have gathered on sports franchises since 1998.  Please refer to the 
appendices to view the data sets, which were also compiled with some attendance figures 
from ESPN.   
 
Empirical Research: 
 
Forbes Transaction Analysis: 
 
Drawing upon my earlier discussion about the tendency of Forbes to understate the value 
of franchises, I decided it would be wise to analyze transactions across all four major 
sports in the last few years.  Specifically, for all changes in ownership from 1999-2003, I 
compared the actual sales price to the appraisal given by Forbes in the year preceding the 
deal.   Overall, franchises traded at a 27% premium to the amount listed in the magazine, 
which can be interpreted to suggest the presence of the “ego factor.” A detailed data set is 
presented in Appendix E, but the table below presents summary statistics for each sport. 
 
TABLE B  
Sport Football Basketball Baseball Hockey 
Average Forbes Value: $354 $175 $241 $132 
Average Transaction Price: $632.50 $240.86 $268.10 $131.23 
Average Premium 79% 38% 11% -1% 
 
Surprisingly, the results for each sport are quite different, with football teams demanding 
much larger premiums than any other sport.  Furthermore, hockey transactions even 
occur at slight discounts, another astonishing finding.  A possible explanation for these 
discrepancies is the actual financial standing and potential of each league.  Without 
question, football is the soundest sport financially, with a salary cap limiting player 
expenses and the most lucrative television deals, while hockey is the weakest in these 
areas.  Furthermore, perhaps the glamour of football surpasses that of the other supports, 
and owners are thus much prouder to own an NFL team than a NHL team.  These 
explanations seem more than plausible given the stigmas attached to each of these sports 
by society.   
 
Recent Transaction Examples And Discussion: 
 
 
In  2003, the Boston Celtics were sold to venture capitalists for $360 million, a price tag 
that represented the highest amount ever paid to acquire a professional basketball team.  
This transaction occurred at a 31% premium to the calculation performed of the Boston 
Celtics by Forbes in 2002 and at a multiple of 3.8 times the team’s revenue.  This far 
exceeded standard NBA multiples, which typically fall in the 2.5 to 3 range.  In trying to 
understand the cause of this discrepancy, Forbes questioned bankers familiar with the 
deal.  Allegedly, the negotiating team made several optimistic assumptions, such as the 
amount of playoff games the Celtics would host and the amount of stadium revenues they 
would be able to squeeze out from Jeremy Jacobs, the owner of the Fleet Center.  To 
finance such a purchase, the capitalists, led by Wycliffe and H. Irving Grousbeck, 
obtained $180 million unsecured debt.  Typically, the NBA imposes a limit of $100 
million, but in the case, it relaxed its guidelines as this propelled the revenues it would 
soon receive for the Charlotte expansion franchise.   Regardless, the sale of the Celtics 
still appears to be guided by some ego factor, as the projections made by the capitalists 
were somewhat unrealistic.  It seems more probable that these explanations were used to 
obtain more favorable debt agreements, and that the acquirers were willing to assume a 
lot of risk for this once in a lifetime opportunity.13   
 
Earlier this year, negotiations began to take place for the New Jersey Nets, the two time 
defending champions of the Eastern Conference in the NBA.  On February 17, 2003, 
Forbes valued the Nets, a firm with an income of approximately $4.5 million, at $217 
million.  Nevertheless, the current owners agreed in principal to sell the team to Bruce 
Ratner for roughly $300 million, a figure that again far exceeds that which Forbes 
presented.  Ratner, a real estate developer, intends to move the team from the Continental 
Arena to a new state of the art complex he would construct in Brooklyn that would serve 
as the center of a $2.5 billion office, residential and shopping complex.  Clearly, these 
potential additions would likely juice up revenues, with attendance likely to soar because 
of the surrounding attractions.  Furthermore, a Brooklyn location would provide far easier 
access to fans than the Continental Arena, as the city has a fully developed transportation 
system.  In this deal, it does seem that Ratner can add value to the numbers Forbes 
generated by moving cities, thus justifying some premium.  However, with up front costs 
likely to reach into the billions, and no inflows projected for about 10 years, it is 
questionable whether an $80 million premium was truly warranted.14 
 
Forbes Multivariate Regression Analysis: 
 
In order to dig deeper and complete the aforementioned task of determining which factors 
most affect the market price of a sports franchise, I also collected data on a multitude of 
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variables that one would imagine to be vital to a sports franchise.  These variables 
included revenue figures, attendance records, leverage ratios, risk proxies, and team 
performance measures.   These factors were used as the independent variables in 
multivariate regressions, with Forbes’ value acting as the sole dependent variable.  I ran 5 
different models for each sport in isolation and then as a combined entity.  In each of 
these models, Debt/Revenue and TRPS (team relative productivity score) were used as 
variables to measure risk and team performance respectively.  For clarity, TRPS 
compares the number of wins per player payroll relative to the rest of the league. Below 
are the descriptive coefficients for each model, while the t-statistics can be found in 
Appendix J.    
 
TABLE C: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (Coefficients) 
 Model 1: Forbes Value = b + (Debt/Revenue)X1 + (TRPS)X2 + (Operating Income)X3 
* = Significant at 5% level Football Basketball Baseball Hockey All 
Intercept 482.7935* 220.6666* 593.0414* 240.0713* 353.0970* 
Debt/Revenue 43.3003 23.9015 -13.2022 12.3389 28.1356 
TRPS -0.1176 0.1928 -2.8010* -0.8135* -0.9561* 
Income 3.5263* 0.6587 4.7631* 2.9727* 6.6186* 
R Square 0.7070 0.0906 0.4996 0.3689 0.5394 
 
Model 1 shows that operating income will show up as a significant predictor of value, 
given that there are no revenue proxies in the model.  A surprising feature is the 
significant negative coefficient given to TRPS in several of the tests, indicating that value 
is negatively related to team performance. However, the low R Squares (relative to Table 
D-G) and the significant intercepts show the weakness of this test of predicting value.   
 TABLE D: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (Coefficients) 
 Model 2: Forbes Value = b + (Debt/Revenue)X1 + (TRPS)X2 + (Total Revenues)X3 + (Total Expenses)X4  
* = Significant at 5% level Football Basketball Baseball Hockey All 
Intercept -12.8575 30.9665 -217.0535* -20.4887 -91.3932* 
Debt/Revenue 16.5265* -8.5810 -0.5032 2.3022 7.0044 
TRPS -0.1175 -0.0779 0.0364 -0.1977* -0.2357 
Revenues 3.8219* 2.6754* 3.2947* 2.8567* 5.9244* 
Expenses -0.3804 0.0258 -0.8722 0.0375 2.0214* 
R Square 0.9540 0.8647 0.9173 0.9381 0.8846 
 
Model 2 breaks up operating income into total revenues and total expenses.  The 
importance of this separation is highlighted by the improvement in the R Squares from 
Table C to Table D.  We also can see the preeminent relevance of revenues, which 
maintain high coefficients and have emerged as a significant predictor of value in all of 
the models.   
 
TABLE E: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (Coefficients) 
 Model 3: Forbes Value = b + (Debt/Revenue)X1 + (TRPS)X2 + (Gate Receipts)X3 + (Payroll)X4 
* = Significant at 5% level Football Basketball Baseball Hockey All 
Intercept 346.1121* 173.6968* -67.9440 39.5076 -125.6140 
Debt/Revenue 21.5139 -15.8540 -6.4470 4.3752 20.6415 
TRPS -0.4443 -0.2559 -0.0231 -0.2813 0.3373 
Gate Receipts 7.0152* 5.3568* 2.6838* 3.5111* 0.1908 
Payroll -0.7089 0.8737 -3.2059* -0.6985 -6.1807* 
R Square 0.5737 0.7161 0.8507 0.7828 0.4182 
 Model 3 analyzes the components of revenues and expenses that are most related to the 
team’s operations (gate receipts and payroll).  This model is far less explanatory than that 
used in Table D, but still, we again see the importance of the revenue proxy, gate 
receipts, in predicting value.  This variable is significant in 4/5 of the regressions. 
 
TABLE F: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (Coefficients) 
Model 4: Forbes Value = b + (Debt/Revenue)X1 + (TRPS)X2 + (Gate Receipts)X3 + (Other Revenue)X4 +  (Total Expenses)X5 
* = Significant at 5% level Football Basketball Baseball Hockey All 
Intercept -21.6596 38.9924 -269.7988* -19.1196 -90.1351* 
Debt/Revenue 22.6583* -9.5753 2.7859 2.3731 11.5693 
TRPS -0.0298 -0.1046 0.0896 -0.2024* -0.1978 
Gate Receipts 2.5467* 3.0297* 3.0232* 2.9138* 2.9558* 
Other Rev. 4.4256* 2.4786* 4.3476* 2.8048* 6.2462* 
Expenses -0.1169 0.0792 -0.6518 0.0479 1.3032* 
R Square 0.9635 0.8663 0.9223 0.9382 0.9177 
 
Model 4 is a more detailed breakdown of the revenue side of operating income, as it 
offers insight into gate receipts and cash streams that result from other sources such as 
cable deals.  Both of these variables are significant across all of the regressions, and the 
high R Squares indicate the predictive power of this model.  The coefficients themselves 
reveal that other revenues, the money that arises from things besides gate receipts 
(attendance), are more important to increasing the value of a franchise.    
 
TABLE G: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (Coefficients) 
  Model 5: Forbes Value = b + (Debt/Revenue)X1 + (TRPS)X2 + (Revenue)X3 + (Payroll)X4 +  (Other  Expenses)X5 
* = Significant at 5% level Football Basketball Baseball Hockey All 
Intercept -18.3433 105.2621 -213.4741* -16.9789 -104.7534* 
Debt/Revenue 16.6355* -9.2111 0.1598 3.1527 11.3428 
TRPS -0.1116 -0.0734 0.0425 -0.1862 -0.1694 
Revenues 4.0222* 2.4097* 3.3414* 2.9601* 5.9843* 
Payroll -0.3716 1.3791 -0.9087 -0.0256 1.4868* 
Other Exp. 0.2011 -0.9993 -0.5623 0.6040 3.1074* 
R Square 0.9545 0.8753 0.9174 0.9398 0.8871 
 
Model 5 is a more detailed breakdown of the expense side of operating income, as it 
offers insight into the payroll and money that is dispersed on ancillary items such as 
interest on debt.  These variables are both significant in the combined regression, 
although they are insignificant for all sports in isolation.  Again, revenue is significant in 
all of the tests, highlighting its true importance in assessing the value of a franchise.   The 
high R Squares validate the explanatory power of this model.  
 
I also conducted the same tests using transaction price as the dependent variable for the 
franchises that have changed ownership since 1999.  As the chart below will indicate, 
these models have less explanatory power than those above, which is expected given old 
transaction prices are compared with 2003 balance sheet and income statement figures.  
For the most part, revenue continues to stand out as the most important variable guiding 
value.  The coefficients are displayed in the table below. 
 
TABLE H: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (Coefficients) 
* = Significant at 5% level Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept 301.8685* -127.0685 -208.1446 -127.4049 -140.4166 
Debt/Revenue 56.4015 57.2198* 75.1438 57.0303* 51.7940* 
TRPS -0.9262 -0.0749 0.2525 -0.0639 0.2152 
Income 6.2017* -- -- -- -- 
Revenue -- 5.3401* -- -- 5.4423* 
Gate Receipts -- -- 1.1436 5.7664* -- 
Other Rev. -- -- -- 5.3007* -- 
Expenses -- 1.8164 -- 1.9399 -- 
Payroll -- -- -4.9245* -- 0.4835 
Other Exp. -- -- -- -- 5.0361* 
R Square 0.4413 0.8388 0.6295 0.8398 0.8581 
 
Conclusion: 
 
The existing research and my own analysis establishes that revenue is the most important 
factor in determining the value of a franchise.  It also shows that each sport is driven by 
different factors.  For example, the tremendous cable deals in the NFL make “other 
revenues” much more important to value than attendance and gate receipts.   
Furthermore, as transaction prices typically exceed the appraised worth of teams 
conducted by independent sources such as Forbes, there is some evidence confirming the 
presence of an ego factor.  However, it would be unfair to attribute the entire premium to 
this feeling of prestige.   
 
The research that I have conducted should pave the way for future inquiries into the 
mechanics of valuing a sport franchise.  Hopefully, my results have provided insight into 
the true sources of value for an organization, although this can only be used for guidance, 
as market prices will inevitably be determined by supply and demand.  However, perhaps 
if owners paid more attention to the bottom line and avoid overpayment, there would be 
less financial problems occurring within modern day sports.  This is one of the most 
important and interesting areas that remain available for future studies.   If owners 
continually focus on growing revenues without an eye on expenses, stagnation and 
bankruptcy will cripple professional sports.  This was exactly the mantra that resulted in 
the technology bubble of the late 1990s.  Accordingly, future studies should analyze the 
sources of profitability for a franchise and the factors that need to be in place, such as 
salary caps, that will be useful to insure the efficiency and safety of sports financially.   
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Appendix J (Please Insert Appendices A-I From Excel Before) 
T-STATISTICS: 
 Model 1: Forbes Value = b + (Debt/Revenue)X1 + (TRPS)X2 + (Operating Income)X3 
* = Significant at 5% level Football Basketball Baseball Hockey All 
Intercept 14.3537* 5.3662* 7.6386* 6.6900* 7.8864* 
Debt/Revenue 3.0287 0.9676 -0.3829 0.7432 1.3073 
TRPS -0.4762 0.5887 -4.2977* -3.1209* -2.6859* 
Income 6.4212* 1.2082 2.8488 3.0585* 11.4871* 
 
T-STATISTICS: 
 Model 2: Forbes Value = b + (Debt/Revenue)X1 + (TRPS)X2 + (Total Revenues)X3 + (Total Expenses)X4  
* = Significant at 5% level Football Basketball Baseball Hockey All 
Intercept -0.2968 1.3525 -2.7493* -0.9916 -2.7857 
Debt/Revenue 2.6745 -0.8486 -0.0351 0.4307 0.6438 
TRPS -1.1793 -0.5947 0.0984 -2.1332* -1.2875 
Revenues 17.1517* 9.7247* 4.6708* 9.1968* 20.2838* 
Expenses -0.9688 0.1168 -1.0195 0.1024 5.3113* 
 
T-STATISTICS: 
 Model 3: Forbes Value = b + (Debt/Revenue)X1 + (TRPS)X2 + (Gate Receipts)X3 + (Payroll)X4 
* = Significant at 5% level Football Basketball Baseball Hockey All 
Intercept 3.0480* 4.1755* -0.6665 1.0900 -1.6542 
Debt/Revenue 1.0599 -1.0805 -0.3354 0.4412 0.8421 
TRPS -1.4251 -1.2854 -0.0459 -1.5040 0.8098 
Gate Receipts 4.3047* 6.8273* 3.2438* 4.6039* 0.1582 
Payroll -0.6205 1.1223 -3.3638* -0.9840 -6.8920* 
 
T-STATISTICS: 
Model 4: Forbes Value = b + (Debt/Revenue)X1 + (TRPS)X2 + (Gate Receipts)X3 + (Other Revenue)X4 +  (Total Expenses)X5 
* = Significant at 5% level Football Basketball Baseball Hockey All 
Intercept -0.5485 1.4038 -3.0369* -0.8589 -3.2400* 
Debt/Revenue 3.7207* -0.9173 0.1931 0.4343 1.2508 
TRPS -0.3084 -0.7350 0.2433 -2.0707* -1.2730 
Gate Receipts 4.7906* 4.1677* 4.1355* 6.6862* 5.8937* 
Other Rev. 14.3505* 5.3207* 3.9660* 6.7172* 24.7733* 
Expenses -0.3151 0.3215 -0.7539 0.1270 3.8384* 
 
 
 
T-STATISTICS: 
  Model 5: Forbes Value = b + (Debt/Revenue)X1 + (TRPS)X2 + (Revenue)X3 + (Payroll)X4 +  (Other  Expenses)X5 
* = Significant at 5% level Football Basketball Baseball Hockey All 
Intercept -0.4062 1.8257 -2.5442* -0.8000 -3.1171* 
Debt/Revenue 2.6541* -0.9279 0.0105 0.5756 1.0191 
TRPS -1.0981 -0.5714 0.1120 -1.9747 -0.9089 
Revenues 9.0257 7.3043* 4.2712* 8.7918* 20.4668* 
Payroll -0.9327 1.3912 -1.0040 -0.0681 2.9641* 
Other Exp. 0.1698 -1.3076 -0.2536 0.7761 4.0404* 
 
T-STATISTICS: 
Transaction Analysis: Sales Price = b + (Debt/Revenue)X1 + (TRPS)X2 + ….. 
* = Significant at 5% level Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept 3.0748* -1.7216 -1.8759 -1.7012 -1.9828 
Debt/Revenue 1.2415 2.3058* 2.0196 2.2648* 2.1707* 
TRPS -1.2827 -0.1839 0.3994 -0.1544 0.5170 
Income 4.0489* -- -- -- -- 
Revenue -- 6.3356* -- -- 6.7471* 
Gate Receipts -- -- 0.6864 4.3170* -- 
Other Rev. -- -- -- 6.1607* -- 
Expenses -- 1.8453 -- 1.8618 -- 
Payroll -- -- -4.0220 -- 0.4160 
Other Exp. -- -- -- -- 2.6499* 
 
